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Abstract
We provide an estimate of the effect of refugees’ length of waiting time in the Danish asylum
system on their subsequent employment using administrative data. In contrast to previous
studies, we take into account that refugees’ labor market integration is delayed since their
labor market access is restricted during the asylum-seeking phase. We find that an addi-
tional year of waiting time decreases subsequent employment by 3.2 percentage points on
average. This effect is mostly driven by the delay in the labor market engagement among
refugees. Waiting time may have an effect on subsequent employment that is additional to
the delay effect, and this could be either positive or negative depending on the nature of the
conditions under which asylum seekers live while waiting for their cases to be processed.
We find that this additional effect is positive and statistically significant until observable indi-
vidual characteristics are included, at which point it becomes small in magnitude and no lon-
ger significant.
Introduction
In the European Union, 1.6 million asylum seekers had their claim for protection recognized
and resettled as refugees during 2014–2017 [1]. This is the highest number since World War II
[2]. An asylum seeker is a person applying for protection under the UNHCR Refugee Conven-
tion from 1951, while a refugee is a person whose claim for protection is recognized [3]. It is
an important issue how to best facilitate integration of this population into their new societies
without overstraining welfare systems. Arguably, the most crucial indicator for successful inte-
gration is labor market participation [2,4–8]. Having a job not only generates income, but also
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accelerates integration by positioning individuals and their families to achieve better health,
housing, and education. Furthermore, the sooner the refugees gain employment, the sooner
they will become self-sufficient and the longer they will help the public finances by paying
income tax and making social security contributions [2,7,9,10].
A growing body of evidence shows that refugees’ labor market performance initially lags
behind that of otherwise comparable non-refugee migrants, but the two groups converge over
time. For example, studies from the US show that although refugees’ employment rate is com-
parable to that of non-refugee migrants, their pay and job quality are significantly lower. How-
ever, 10 years after resettlement in the US the refugees’ labor market performance surpasses
that of other migrants [11,12]. Similarly, studies from Europe find that refugees’ average
employment rate is 10–30% lower than that of other non-Western migrants, but the difference
between the groups disappears 15–20 years after resettlement [13–15]. In contrast, studies
from Norway and Denmark, based on individual level, longitudinal register data, where com-
position effects are carefully accounted for, show that even though the employment gap
decreases the first 5–10 years after resettlement, a gap remains thereafter [16,17].
The conditions under which asylum seekers live while waiting for their application for pro-
tection is decided upon, as well as the duration of the period of this determination, offer
opportunities for policymakers to influence the chances of these individuals integrating suc-
cessfully into their new societies upon gaining refugee status. In this paper, we examine one
aspect of asylum policies, namely the impact of the time spent in the asylum system on subse-
quent employment among refugees. The majority of the studies in the literature have focused
on how specific aspects of the asylum process relate to mental health (for a literature review,
see Ryan et al. [18]). Among the conditions considered are the poor circumstances present in
the institutional asylum centers where asylum seekers are restricted to live [19,20], frequent
relocations between asylum centers [21], the use of detention [22–24], and very long asylum
procedures [25–30]. These practices have been shown to be associated with adverse mental
health. The few existing studies of the impact of waiting time on subsequent employment pro-
vide mixed evidence. For example, Bakker et al. [31] find no independent effect of waiting
time once other factors are accounted for, while Hainmueller et al. [32] document an overall
negative impact on employment. In this paper, we provide new evidence from Denmark,
using register-based data for the period 1997–2014. We adopt the strategy of Hainmueller
et al. [32] to account for the potential endogeneity of waiting time. Our study is the first to esti-
mate the additional impact of waiting time that is independent of the delay effect caused by the
simple fact that time spent waiting in the asylum system is time not spent searching for a job.
Materials and methods
Study population
We use individual-level longitudinal register-data on refugees who were granted residence per-
mit in Denmark in the period 1997–1 May 2013. The project is approved by the Danish Data
Protection Agency. We exclude refugees with humanitarian residence permit to avoid reverse
causality problems, as the waiting time for a humanitarian residence permit is often long and
given for a reason that reduces the employment prospects of the affected individuals. We
observe refugee status (convention/protection), and dates of application and issuance of resi-
dence permit, which allows us to compute the duration of the waiting time. We also observe
gender, age, country of origin, first municipality after resettlement and yearly employment sta-
tus. We include all refugees aged 18–55 at the date of application. The refugees are followed for
up to 18 years after residence permit issuance or until the maximum age of 60.
The effect of waiting time in the asylum system on employment
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Out of 15,038 eligible individuals, we exclude those without valid dates of application and
residence permit issuance (N = 42), and with only one valid employment registration (N = 22).
Refugees who wait more than 6 years (N = 96) are excluded to avoid outlier bias. Finally, Bos-
nians are excluded as they were subject to special laws. In total, 14,528 refugees are included.
Ethics statement
This project was approved by the Danish Data Protection Agency (No. 2015-41-4324) and by
Statistics Denmark. According the Danish Data Protection Act [33], informed consent is not
required for approved research projects that are based on register data and conducted by
researchers affiliated to authorized Danish research environments (see also Ethics Statement
and Data Availability Statement).
The Danish asylum system
On arrival, asylum seekers are registered by the police and then wait for their first interview
with the Danish Immigration Service. The time waiting for the first interview varies according
to the capacity of the Danish Immigration Service relative to the number of applicants. Cases
may be decided after the first interview or there may be a second interview. In rare cases,
rejected asylum seekers have their cases reevaluated which leads to further waiting time. This
procedure implies some scope for unobserved characteristics of the asylum seekers to affect
the length of the waiting period.
Generally, asylum seekers with no prior residence permit are required to live in an asylum
facility until their case is determined. During this period, asylum seekers’ interaction with the
surrounding society is limited as most accommodation centers are placed in sparsely popu-
lated areas with limited access. However, basic needs such as housing, food and clothing are
provided by the Danish government. Asylum seekers also receive instructions about the Dan-
ish society and culture. Regarding healthcare, adult asylum seekers have access to general prac-
titioner services but to other health services only in case of an emergency. In line with most
European countries, asylum seekers’ access to the Danish labour market is restricted during
the asylum-seeking phase [34]. Before May 1st, 2013, asylum seekers were not permitted to
take employment and even after a change in the law, only few have been permitted to work
due to bureaucratic complexities and practical obstacles [35,36].
Conceptual framework
There is a large literature on the labor market integration of immigrants, however the empiri-
cal evidence is mixed and there is an ongoing debate about the performance of immigrants in
the labor market of host countries and how their employment prospects evolve over time [37–
41]. We are concerned with the labor market integration of refugees and follow Chiswick [37]
and Borjas [38] in accounting for the role of time since immigration. The time since immigra-
tion is particularly important for refugees, since they face additional constraints that other
migrants do not, such as restrictions in travel and employment [39]. The timeline describing
the various steps involved in the asylum process and recognized refugees’ entry to the receiving
country labor market is illustrated in Fig 1.
The time since application of a refugee, tsa, can be decomposed into
tsa ¼ twþ tsrp; ð1Þ
where tw is the waiting time and tsrp is the time elapsed since the residence permit was issued.
In a regression of employment on tw, it matters whether one incorporates tsa or tsrp into the
The effect of waiting time in the asylum system on employment
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analysis. Consider the following simple linear model:
empl ¼ y twþ d tsrp: ð2Þ
In Eq (2), θ represents the parameter of interest, i.e., the impact of waiting time on subsequent
employment. This captures the combined effect of any beneficial and detrimental conditions
experienced by asylum seekers during the waiting period. For instance, restricted access to the
labor market and to health care services plausibly lead to worsened subsequent labor market
performance through skill atrophication and increased mental health problems, while gained
knowledge of the receiving country language and culture is likely to have a positive effect on
future employment. Thus, the sign and the size of θ is ambiguous and depends on the institu-
tional setting.
The parameter δ captures the speed at which refugees integrate into the labor market upon
being granted residence permit. Based on the empirical evidence mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the parameter δ is expected to be positive as employment will likely increase over time
after the residence permit is granted. An additional year of waiting without labor market access
implies that tsrp is decreased by one and hence that the employment rate is reduced by δ. In
other words, waiting reduces the subsequent employment rate, simply because labor market
integration is delayed. Therefore we say that the speed parameter δ represents a pure delay
effect. An example of a ‘pure delay’ effect of waiting time on employment is illustrated in Fig 2.
Incorporating Eq (1) into Eq (2) and defining π = θ–δ results in
empl ¼ p twþ d tsa: ð3Þ
Eq (3) illustrates that conditioning on time since arrival, the parameter on waiting time, π = θ–
δ, does not measure the combined effect of waiting time. It is in fact the difference between the
combined effect of waiting time and the speed of the refugees’ labor market integration. Since
δ is expected to be positive, we expect π = θ–δ to be smaller than θ. Importantly, π may be
Fig 1. The asylum process. The asylum seeker applies for protection at t1 and receives residence permit at t2. The waiting time, tw, is the difference
between t2 and t1. The employment status is observed at t3. The time since residence permit issuance, tsrp, is the difference between t3 and t2 while the
time since application, tsa, equals the sum of tw and tsrp.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.g001
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negative even if the combined effect of the waiting time conditions is positive, if the speed of
labor market integration is larger.
We will estimate more general versions of (2) and (3), conditioning on tsrp or tsa. We con-
clude from the analysis here that (2), conditioning on tsrp, identifies the combined effect of
waiting time that is additional to the pure delay effect, while (3), conditioning on tsa, identifies
the difference between the two effects.
Empirical strategy
The impact of waiting time on subsequent employment may be endogenously determined if
unobserved characteristics of refugees affect both their waiting time and their subsequent
employment chances. Our identification strategy is the same as Hainmueller et al. (32). Specifi-
cally, they argue that case workers at the Swiss ‘State Secretariat for Migration’ tend to decide
applications from asylum seekers with the same origin in batches “once a certain number of
similar cases have accumulated” (ibid pp. 6 of 7). This creates exogenous variation in the wait-
ing time, where asylum seekers at the bottom of a batch wait longer than those at the top.
Empirically, they implement this idea by including a large set of control variables that
includes fixed effects for origin, the week of entry, gender, age, quarters of residency, religion,
ethnicity, and assigned canton so that the coefficient on waiting time is identified just from
within-group variation. In their most comprehensive model, the identification is based only
on the variation in waiting time among refugees from the same origin who applied for
Fig 2. Illustration of the pure delay effect. Restrictions on asylum seeker’s access to the labor market creates a negative effect on their employment rate
even though the sum of the conditions during waiting time has no effect on employment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.g002
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protection during the same week. Thus, their assumption is that refugees who are similar on a
rich set of covariates also share the unobserved characteristics correlated with waiting time
and subsequent employment. Under this assumption, batch processing ensures that otherwise
similar applicants who happen to arrive right before or right after a batch has been processed
faced quite different waiting periods simply because they got lucky or unlucky.
In this section, we provide evidence that there is in fact much exogenous variation in wait-
ing time in our context. We are, however, not able to rule out that unobserved individual char-
acteristics also affect waiting time. Therefore, we refrain from making a strong claim that our
estimates are causal.
Fig 3 plots the waiting time against the date of application. There is substantial variation in
the waiting time for refugees arriving close in time. The shale-like pattern that is evident on
the figure reveals that there is a clear tendency for cases to be decided in batches. These pat-
terns persist in plots for each country of origin (not shown). The relative position of refugees
in a batch—and thus their differences in waiting times—is likely to be unrelated to their
employment prospects.
An interview with two senior employees from the Danish Immigration Service helped us to
discover several mechanisms and practices in the Danish system that strengthen our argument
for the existence of random variation in waiting times (the employees explicitly asked for ano-
nymity). One example is the timing of interviews. We were told that the interviews with asy-
lum seekers from the same country were typically gathered and conducted on the same day.
Interviews required the presence of a translator speaking the relevant language and shortages
of translators have led to further variation in waiting times. Second, applications from specific
countries have been put on hold at times when there was uncertainty regarding whether it was
safe for the asylum seekers to return to their country of origin. Notable examples of events
leading to such uncertainty were the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the capture of Saddam
Hussein in 2003. Third, the first group of applicants from countries of new conflicts would
experience longer waiting times until documentation for the conditions in these countries
were confirmed, causing a batch of applicants to be accumulated in the system before a sudden
reduction in waiting times for asylum seekers arriving later. Fourth, waiting times are affected
by holidays, as is visually evident on Fig 3. Fifth, it has been a regular occurrence that batches
of cases have been reevaluated after decisions of principle from the Refugee Appeal Board.
This list of causes for random variation in waiting times is probably not exhaustive. In sum-
mary, these factors altogether lend support to the notion that much of the variation in waiting
times, especially among asylum seekers from the same country of origin, is likely to be
exogenous.
Our estimates are obtained from the following regressions:
emplit ¼ y twi þ bXit þ f 1ðtsrpitÞ þ Zwyc þ lm þ εit; ðModel 1Þ
emplit ¼ p twi þ bXit þ f 2ðtsaitÞ þ Zwyc þ lm þ εit; ðModel 2Þ
where emplit is the employment status of refugee i in year t; twi is the waiting time measured in
years; Xit is a set of observable characteristics including binary indicators for gender and
whether the refugee has gained convention or protection status, and continuous values for age
and age squared; f1(tsrpit) is a set of dummies corresponding to the number of quarters elapsed
since the issuance of the residence permit; similarly, f2(tsait) is a set of dummies corresponding
to the number of quarters elapsed since the date of the application; β´ is a vector of parameter
estimates corresponding to the controls in Xit; ηwyc is a set of fixed effects for each week of
arrival by country origin, while λm is a set of fixed effects representing the first municipality of
´
´
The effect of waiting time in the asylum system on employment
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737 November 8, 2018 6 / 14
residence after resettlement. Finally, εit is an idiosyncratic error term. The parameter of inter-
est is θ in Model 1 and π in Model 2. As noted earlier, θ measures the combined effect of wait-
ing on the employment rate, while π measures the effect of waiting including also the pure
delay effect. We also estimate versions of Model 1 where the confounders and fixed effects are
included step by step.
Analysis was conducted using Stata/MP 15 and the Stata package “reghdfe”, version 3.2.9,
21 february 2016 written by Sergio Correia [42]. Program codes are available on request.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the time-invariant characteristics of the included refugees and Table 2
show statistics for the time-variant indicators. The mean waiting time is less than a year (0.93),
while the mean employment rate is 27.56%. The average refugee in the sample is followed for
11.12 years resulting in 161,555 individual-year observations.
Table 3 presents the estimation results from Models 1 and 2. Model 1 conditions on the
time since residence permit and identifies the effect of waiting time that is additional to the
pure delay effect. The corresponding parameter is positive, 0.402 (SE: 0.678), but not signifi-
cantly different from zero. In Model 2, which conditions on the time since application, the
impact of the waiting time on employment is statistically significant and negative. According
Fig 3. Batch processing in the Danish asylum system. The length of the waiting time of refugees who received residence permit from year t
until year t-4 plotted against their date of application. The practice of batch processing implemented by the Danish Immigration Service is
indicated by the shale-like pattern observed in the figure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.g003
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to the point estimate, each additional year of waiting in the asylum system causes the employ-
ment rate to decrease by 3.2 percentage points. Thus, the overall effect of waiting is negative
when the pure delay effect is included. Our fixed-effect specifications allow the employment
rate to increase non-linearly over time. The difference between the estimated waiting time
parameters suggests a value of δ = 3.6 in Eq (2), meaning that the employment rate increases
by about 3.6 percentage points per year after the residence permit is granted. This is consid-
ered an estimate of the pure delay effect since an additional year of waiting implies that refu-
gees will miss one year of increase in their employment rate.
Table 4 shows Model 1 with stepwise inclusion of control variables and fixed effects. In the
simple model where we control only for waiting time (column 1), each year of additional waiting
increases the employment rate by 2.3 percentage points (SE: 0.410). As shown in subsequent col-
umns, the size of the estimate decreases as we control for additional variables and fixed effects.
The decrease in the size of the estimate for waiting time indicates that the positive effect in col-
umns 1–5 is the result of a composition effect associated with country of origin, period of applica-
tion, period of issuance of residence permit, and municipality of resettlement. When including
interactions in the control variables, the estimate for waiting time becomes numerically small and
statistically insignificant. Note that the results in column 6 are identical to column 1 in Table 3.
The variable ‘protection status’ comparing the employment rate for refugees with conven-
tion status to those with protection status is of special interest. In all of the estimated models
Table 1. Time-invariant characteristics.
Mean SD
Years waiting 0.93 0.67
Male 0.71 0.45
Age at residence permit issuance 31.24 8.16
Length of record 11.12 5.44
Leaves Denmark before 2014 0.11 0.31
Residence permit status
Convention status 0.38 0.49
Protection status 0.62 0.49
Frequent countries of origin
Iraq 0.30 0.46
Afghanistan 0.18 0.38
Somalia 0.13 0.34
Other countries 0.12 0.32
Syria 0.10 0.30
Iran 0.09 0.28
F. Yugoslavia 0.05 0.21
Russia 0.04 0.19
N (individuals) 14,528
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.t001
Table 2. Time-variant indicators.
Mean SD
Employment (t) 27.56 44.68
Quarters since date of application 31.54 18.91
Quarters since residence permit 27.72 18.78
N (observations) 161,555
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.t002
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except the final model, the sign of this parameter is negative and significant, indicating that
refugees who are evaluated not to be entitled to convention status but only to protection status
have a lower employment rate. However, similarly to the parameter for waiting time, the size
and significance of this parameter decreases as more controls are included. Moreover, it
switches sign in the most comprehensive specification in column 6, suggesting that once all
the differences between refugees who received residence permit under protection status and
those under convention status are accounted for, the likelihood of subsequent employment
between the two groups is statistically indistinguishable.
In addition, we have estimated models (not shown) with time since residence permit mea-
sured categorically in quarters as in Model 2 interacted with residence status. This analysis
produced estimates for waiting time that are similar to those presented here and are available
from the authors upon request.
Discussion
In the light of the record-high numbers of refugees throughout the world today it is important
to address the potential obstacles to the labor market integration of resettled refugees. In most
European countries, asylum seekers have restricted or no access to the labor market while
waiting for their claim for protection to be decided [34]. Thus, the waiting time in the asylum
Table 3. Fixed effect regression coefficients of the length of the waiting time in the Danish asylum system on
employment, including different measures for the duration of stay in Denmark.
Model 1: With time since
residence permit
Model 2: With time since date of
application
Years waiting 0.402 -3.154���
(0.678) (0.684)
Male 13.59��� 13.60���
(0.559) (0.558)
Age (at time t) 0.543�� 0.526��
(0.166) (0.166)
Age sqr (at time t) -0.0186��� -0.0185���
(0.00208) (0.00207)
Protection status 0.909 0.961
(1.022) (1.022)
Quarters since residence permit
(dummies)
Yes No
Quarters since date of application
(dummies)
No Yes
# observations 161,555 161,555
# individuals 14,528 14,528
# parameters estimated 79 88
# fixed effects: Apply week � origin 4,311 4,311
# fixed effects: 1st municipality after
resettlement
315 315
R2 0.241 0.242
Outcome is 100 for employed and 0 for not employed. Robust SEs in parentheses; clustered on individuals.
� p< 0.05
�� p< 0.01
��� p< 0.001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.t003
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systems is one such obstacle, causing a delay in labor market entry. In this study we evaluate
the combined effect of the waiting time on refugees’ subsequent employment.
Using unique register data, we find that refugees’ waiting time in the Danish asylum system
entails a significant pure delay effect on their subsequent employment. Every additional year
of waiting decreases the employment rate by approximately 3 percentage points. Considering
the average employment rate of refugees in our sample of 28%, this translates into an employ-
ment reduction in the magnitude of more than 10%. We find such differences in employment
rates to be important in their own right. One may also consider the cost of housing asylum
seekers, which is around € 28,500 ($ 33,100) per asylum seeker year in Denmark [43], and the
lost tax-income accumulated over time due to the delayed labor market entry must be added
to this amount.
We also find suggestive evidence indicating that waiting time in the Danish asylum system
has a small positive effect on employment in baseline models that only account for demo-
graphic characteristics of refugees. However, when the geographically resettlement patterns
and the interaction between time of application and country of origin are considered, we see
no significant impact of waiting time beyond the pure delay effect. These results are surprising
given the correlational evidence cited earlier suggesting that waiting in the asylum system
might be detrimental to mental health.
Table 4. Fixed effect regression coefficients of the length of waiting time in the Danish asylum system on employment. Stepwise inclusion of controls and fixed
effects.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Years waiting 2.306��� 1.985��� 2.060��� 1.381�� 0.957� 0.402
(0.410) (0.393) (0.393) (0.442) (0.441) (0.678)
Male 12.87��� 12.76��� 12.75��� 12.85��� 13.59���
(0.533) (0.534) (0.536) (0.528) (0.559)
Age (t) 0.570��� 0.541��� 0.476�� 0.533��� 0.543��
(0.158) (0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.166)
Age sqr (t) -0.0181��� -0.0178��� -0.0174��� -0.0180��� -0.0186���
(0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00203) (0.00201) (0.00208)
Protection status -2.650��� -1.438� -1.077 0.909
(0.648) (0.667) (0.676) (1.022)
Constant 25.37���
(0.460)
Quarters since residence permit No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 161,555 161,555 161,555 161,555 161,555 161,555
# individuals 14,528 14,528 14,528 14,528 14,528 14,528
# parameters estimated 1 78 79 79 79 79
# FE: Origin 90 90 90 90
# FE: Apply week 913 913
# FE: 1st municipality after resettlement 318
# FE: Apply week � origin + 1st municipality after resettlement 4,626
R-squared 0.001 0.123 0.123 0.149 0.164 0.241
Outcome is 100 for employed and 0 for not employed. Robust SEs in parentheses; clustered on individuals.
� p < 0.05
�� p < 0.01
��� p< 0.001
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206737.t004
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Our finding could reflect a combination of counteracting negative and positive effects of
the conditions during waiting in the Danish case. Among the potential negative effects are
increased mental health problems and skill atrophication, while some of the potential positive
effects are human and social capital accumulation, such as host-country language acquisition,
knowledge about institutions, network building etc. Identifying the channels through which
these factors influence subsequent employment is an important area for future research.
Strengths and weaknesses
To our knowledge, this is the longest full-population, cohort study combining information
from the asylum-seeking phase with yearly, individual-level register data on employment sta-
tus. The data have no attrition beyond emigration and death. Further, our data allow us to
account for demographics and geographical resettlement patterns, and for composition effects
regarding country of origin and time of application. Our empirical specification enables us to
separate the pure delay effect of waiting from any additional effect of waiting on employment.
The pure delay effect is not affected by endogeneity issues as it is a completely mechanical
effect.
Our data have some limitations. For example, we lack information on the exact circum-
stances prior to asylum seeking as well as the experiences faced by these individuals during the
period of waiting. However, we do not suspect lack of information on pre-migration education
or employment status to affect the length of the waiting period, as Denmark does not grant
asylum on economic grounds. Regarding the lack of information on the conditions during the
asylum-seeking phase, we rely on the inclusion of fixed effects for each week of application to
control for changes over time in the quality and the conditions of the Danish asylum system.
Determining which specific aspects of the waiting experience that are beneficial or detrimental
for subsequent employment is an important question. Unfortunately, our data are not
equipped to answer this question. Our largest concern is any potential bias caused by unob-
served confounders correlated with both the length of the waiting period and the subsequent
employment status. For example, unregistered affiliation to an averagely low educated minor-
ity speaking a rare language can create both poor labor market employment and long waiting
times due to sparseness of interpreters. The presence of unobserved confounders would
weaken the causal interpretation of the estimate of waiting time on employment. The impor-
tance of accounting for the pure delay effect would remain the same.
Conclusion
We illustrate the importance of accounting for the pure delay effect when evaluating the effect
of refugees’ waiting time in the asylum system on post-resettlement employment. We find that
waiting time in the Danish asylum system entails a significant pure delay effect on their subse-
quent employment rate. However, the combined effect of waiting time beyond the pure delay
effect is statistically insignificant.
We can relate our results to the findings from the few previous, large-scale quantitative
studies. Bakker et al. [31] find no independent effect of waiting time once other factors are
accounted for. In contrast, using full population register data, we find a significant negative
pure delay effect. Like us, Hainmueller et al. [32] find an overall negative impact on employ-
ment. However, we find in our data that the overall negative impact is due to the pure delay
effect and not to any additional effect of waiting time.
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